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In The Supreme Court of the
State of Utah
HARVEY A. SJOSTROM,
Petitioner,
vs.

Case No. 10054

THERAL V. BISHOP and
ROSS L. COVINGTON,
Respondents.

Reply Brief of Petitioner
ARGUMENT
Point 1. REPLY TO RESPONDENTS POINT 1
"THAT REMEDY IS NOT A WRIT OF RIGHT BUT IS
ADDRESSED TO THE SOUND DISCRETION OF THE
COURT."
In point 1 of respondent's brief, respondents say that
the extraordinary remedy is not a writ of right, but is
addressed to the sound discretion of the court and quote
an Idaho case in support of that proposition as well as 74
C.J.S. 184. Respondents further say that it is not hard
to imagine great public inconvenience and confusion that
would ensue should respondents be ousted. But they do
not point out in what manner the public would be harmed
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and they cannot do so. Do they mean to say that we
have in this case two indispensable officers and that unless
they are retained the people of Logan will suffer even
though they are usurpers. But even though it is conceded
(for the purpose of argument only and not admitting the
same ) that there would be some confusion, that is no
ground that can be considered by this court to ignore
10-6-18. In 59 Corpus Juris pp. 968, Sec. 574, it is said
"as courts are not at liberty to construe a statute when the
language is plain, but must give effect to the legislative
intent as expressed by the language, it follows that where
the language adequately expresses the intention of the
legislature, it must be given effect regardless of the consequence, and the fact that such effect cause hardship,
or inconvenience, or even injustice, or will render another
statute redundant cannot be considered by the Court."
What the respondents are really asking, is for this Court
to refuse to uphold a most positive and mandatory law.
They further say under this point that the public has no
interest in this action. In this they are mistaken for the
public has great interest in upholding the law as should
the individual and if the public should ever become indifferent in so doing, our nation as we know it today
would not long survive.
It seems to petitioner that the authority to file this
petition was given on the 19th day of January, 1964, and
it was on that day that the petition was filed. If we are
right in this then the merits of the case are before this
Court. Counsel says that we have elected or appointed
officers to look after the interest of the public. Public
officers, however well intentioned, are not immune from
4
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ovl'rsight, mistake or prejudice and therefore (b) ( 1)
undt·r Rule 6.5 B.
But what is "sound discretion." Sound discretion is
discrt'tion as settled by ntles, otherwise it is sound only
wht>n the court decides as the party seeking the decision
wants, and hence in practice it will come to mean a notion,
whim or caprice of the judge who exercise it. So holds
the court in the case of Margaret vs. the Connestgo, 2
\Vall Jr. 116, 16 Federal 716, 718. And see Words and
Phrases. Vol. 39, page 497.
\Vhat the respondents are really asking for is for this
Court to re-in-stall them in office for the law which they
failed to confon11 to was both mandatory and self executing. They now ask this Court to make them officers de
jure with all the powers that such officers have. Need
we say anything more on this phase of the case?
POINT 2. REPLY TO RESPONDENTS POINT 2
"TII:\T PETITIONER HAS NO LEGAL AUTHORITY
TO BRING THIS ACTION."
The answer to point 2 of respondeJ?.tS brief is that by
and through said (b) ( 1) under d, 65B, petitioner is
given the right to bring this action.
lT nder this Rule a person claiming a public office in
himself would be the party to bring the action. Under the
old common law he evidently could not do this and it
was only under Rule 104-66-5, Vol. 6, pp. 631, Utah Code
:\nnotated 1943 that he was so allowed and under that
Rule he had to bring it in the name of the state. Under
5
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the present rule he may bring it in his own name and
without security for costs. However, we do not proceed
under this rule, but under the rule which says that a
person may bring action upon any other ground set forth
in subdivision (b) ( 1) of that rule, only if the AttorneyGeneral fails to do so after notice. The words ANY
OTHER means that not only may a private party bring
the action if he claims the office on that ground for himself but in ADDITION to that ground he may bring
action if any person usurps or unlawfully holds and exercises said office as where he has forfeited the same. Al1
he seeks is the enforcement of 10-6-18. Not only have
we been authorized by this Rule here discussed, but have
the consent of the Attorney General as can easily be
gathered from the exhibits in our petition for an Extraordinary Writ. In the case of First National Bank and
Trust Co. of Port Chester vs. New York Title and Insurance Company 12 N.Y.S. (2) 703, 709, 171 Misc. 854,
wherein it is held that: a "permit" in one sense connotes
something less than consent, but in another sense may
mean an authorization, it may mean consent, and may
mean grant, to give leave.
About the case of State vs. Christensen, 84, Ut. 183,
35P. ( 2) 775, cited by petitioner - it was only cited by
petitioner for the purpose of showing that statute on which
the defense was based was mandatory in nature and selfexecuting as is 10-6-18. It was a case where a party
claimed the office for himself. It would seem that the
rule which we contend gives petitioner the right to proceed was spawned or brought about by the case of State
vs. Elliot 13 Utah 200, 44 P. 248.
6
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Point :l

REPLY TO RESPONDENTS PLEA OF

"I,:\( :l-IES."

Under point 3 respondents discuss laches and seek
to maintain that there was laches. In this we disagree.
\lay wc say that the Oregon case mentioned is based on
facts and law entirely different from the instant case as
is the other case cited as may be gathered from our previous briefs and it would serve no useful purpose to rept•at. And we further point to our argument in this bliei
as further reply to this point of laches as also the previous
hrid and typewritten brief. We know of no case where
"bchcs" is either pleadable or provable against the enforcement of a public law such as 10-6-18. See United
States vs. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. U.S. Wash. 61 S.C. 264,
:2S:3. And see Words and Phrases Vol. 24 pp. 79 and
\'ol. 15 page 265. Before we leave this subject we would
ask this: Suppose that respondents failure to publish had
not been discovered until 3 years after their qualification
or had been discovered within 3 months and action immediately brought upon such discoveries, would the respondents still plead "laches." Of course not, if they
follow common reason and logic. Yet the result to the
respondents and public would be the same as if there
had been a lapse of time in bringing action after such discm·er~·· "Laches" is not mere delay in bringing action,
but delay inducing change of position of defendants or
injuriously affecting his legal rights." Shea vs Shea 4
X.E. ( 2) 1015, 1018. In what way was the position· of
respondents or the public altered to detriment of either
by the alleged laches. None at all. The public wants the
law upheld, and we ask what could be more important
than that?
7
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REPLY TO RESPONDENTS "CONCLUSION"
In respondents conclusion they say that the Act of
1917 repealed "all other conflicting Acts," but they fail to
point out any conflict. And Sutherland Statutory Construction Vol 1, pp. 466, Sec. 2013 says: "An express
general repealing clause to the effect that all inconsistant
enactments are repealed, is in legal contemplation a nulity." We maintain that the Act of 1917 did not repeal
10-6-18, but if it did then it has been re-enacted again
and again and we do not believe it can be successfully
charged that this statute has been inadvertantly left in
the Code when we consider upon whom the legislature
relies in the formation of these statutes.
We believe that one of the purposes of this statute
requiring publication within 30 days after qualification
was and is that inasmuch as all appointments are generally
made within the first 30 days after an administration takes
office that the people be informed as to who contributed
to the campaign of the officers elected. Being so informed,
the public would be alerted to see if there was any improper connection between those who contributed and
appointments.
We believe it would really be "news" if the legislature
and those on whom they rely be informed they have been
so negligent as respondents infer and for a period of 50
years.
Counsel in his conclusion, discusses the right of petitioner to bring this action. We believe we have sufficently
8
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answered this in the previous brief, the typewritten brief
and this one and ask the Court to consider these in conrwction with this point so we do not repeat.
The fact remains that respondents are not even de
facto officers and have no right to act as Mayor and Commissioner of Logan City in making contracts and in general have no right to carry on the city's business and submit they should be ousted as Mayor and Commissioner
of Logan City.
Dated this 9th day of April, 1964.
Respectfully submitted,
Harvey A. Sjostrom
375 West Center Street
Logan, Utah
Attorney for Petitioner
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